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Capacity of Steganographic Channels
Jeremiah J. Harmsen, Member, IEEE, William A. Pearlman, Fellow, IEEE,
Abstract—This work investigates a central problem in
steganography, that is: How much data can safely be hidden
without being detected? To answer this question, a formal
definition of steganographic capacity is presented. Once this has
been defined, a general formula for the capacity is developed. The
formula is applicable to a very broad spectrum of channels due
to the use of an information-spectrum approach. This approach
allows for the analysis of arbitrary steganalyzers as well as non-
stationary, non-ergodic encoder and attack channels.
After the general formula is presented, various simplifications
are applied to gain insight into example hiding and detection
methodologies. Finally, the context and applications of the work
are summarized in a general discussion.
Index Terms—Steganographic capacity, stego-channel, ste-
ganalysis, steganography, information theory, information spec-
trum
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
SHANNON’S pioneering work provides bounds on theamount of information that can be transmitted over a noisy
channel. His results show that capacity is an intrinsic property
of the channel itself. This work takes a similar viewpoint
in seeking to find the amount of information that may be
transferred over a stego-channel as seen in Figure 1.
The stego-channel is equivalent to the classic channel with
the addition of the detection function and attack channel. For
the classic channel, a transmission is considered successful if
the decoder properly determines which message the encoder
has sent. In the stego-channel, a transmission is successful
only if the decoder properly determines the sent message and
the detection function is not triggered.
This additional constraint on the channel use leads to the
fundamental view that the capacity of a stego-channel is
an intrinsic property of both the channel and the detection
function. That is to say, the properties of the detection function
influence the capacity just as much as the noise in the channel.
B. Previous Work
There have been a number of applications of information
theory to the steganographic capacity problem[1], [2], [3].
These works give capacity results under distortion constraints
on the hider as well as active adversary. The additional
constraint that the stego-signal retains the same distribution as
the cover-signal serves as the steganalysis detection function.
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Somewhat less work exists exploring capacity with arbi-
trary detection functions. These works are written from a
steganalysis perspective[4], [5] and accordingly give heavy
consideration to the detection function.
This work differs from previous work in a number of
aspects. Most notable is the use of information-spectrum meth-
ods that allow for the analysis of arbitrary detection algorithms
and channels. This eliminates the need to restrict interest
to detection algorithms that operate on sample averages or
behave consistently. Instead, the detection functions may be
instantaneous, meaning the properties of a detector for n
samples need not have any relation to the same detector
for n + 1 samples. Additionally, the typical restriction that
the channel under consideration be consistent, ergodic or
stationary is also lifted.
Another substantial difference is the presence of noise
before the detector. This placement enables the modeling of
common signal processing distortions such as compression,
quantization, etc. The location of the noise adds complexity
not only because of confusion at the decoder, but also because
a signal, carefully crafted to avoid detection, may be corrupted
into one that will trigger the detector.
Finally, the consideration of a cover-signal and distortion
constraint in the encoding function is omitted. This is due
to the view that steganographic capacity is a property of the
channel and the detection function. This viewpoint, along with
the above differences, make a direct comparison to previous
work somewhat difficult, although possible with a number of
simplifications explored in Section V.
C. Groundwork
This chapter lays the groundwork for determining the
amount of information that may be transferred over the chan-
nel shown in Figure 1. Here, the adversary’s goal is to disrupt
any steganographic communication between the encoder and
decoder. To accomplish this a steganalyzer is used to detect
steganographic messages and an attack function is used to
corrupt undetected messages.
We now formally define each of the components in the
system, beginning with the random variable notation.
1) Random Variables: Random variables are denoted by
capital letters, e.g. X . Realizations of these random variables
are denoted as lowercase letters, e.g. x. Each random variable
is defined over a domain denoted with a script X . A sequence
of n random variables is denoted with Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn).
Similarly, an n-length sequence of random variable realiza-
tions is denoted x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn. The probability of
X taking value x ∈ X is pX(x).
Following a signal through Figure 1, we begin in the
space of n-length stego-signals denoted Xn. The signal then
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undergoes some distortion as it travels through the encoder-
channel. This results in an element from the corrupted stego-
signal space of Yn. Finally, the signal is attacked to produce
the attacked stego-signal in space Zn.
2) Steganalyzer: The steganalyzer is a function gn : Yn →
{0, 1} that classifies a sequence of signals from Yn into one of
two categories: containing steganographic information and not
containing steganographic information. The function is defined
as follows for all y ∈ Yn,
gn (y) =
{
1, if y is steganographic
0, if y is not steganographic (1)
The specific type of function may be that of support vector
machine or a Bayesian classifier, etc.
A steganalyzer sequence is denoted as,
g := {g1, g2, g3, . . .}, (2)
where gn : Yn → {0, 1}.
The set of all n length steganalyzers is denoted Gn.
3) Permissible Set: For any steganalyzer gn, the space of
signals Yn is split into the permissible set and the impermis-
sible set.
The permissible set Pgn ⊆ Yn is the inverse image of 0
under gn,
Pgn := g−1n ({0}) = {y ∈ Yn : gn (y) = 0}. (3)
The permissible set is the set of all signals of Yn that the
given steganalyzer, gn will classify as non-steganographic.
Since each steganalyzer has a binary range, a steganalyzer
sequence may be completely described by a sequence of
permissible sets. To denote a steganalyzer sequence in such
a way the following notation is used,
g ∼= {P1,P2,P3, . . .},
where Pn ⊆ Yn is the permissible set for gn.
4) Impermissible Set: The impermissible set Ign ⊆ Yn is
the inverse image of 1 under gn,
Ign := g−1n ({1}) = {y ∈ Yn : gn (y) = 1}. (4)
For a given gn the impermissible set is the set of all signals
in Yn that gn will classify as steganographic.
Example 1: Consider the illustrative sum steganalyzer de-
fined for the binary channel outputs (Y = {0, 1}). The
steganalyzer is defined for y = (y1, . . . , yn) as,
gn (y) =
{
1, if
∑n
i=1 yi >
⌊
n
2
⌋
0, else (5)
The permissible sets for n = 1, 2, 3, 4 are shown in Table I.
TABLE I
SUM STEGANALYZER PERMISSIBLE SETS
P1 = {(0)}
P2 = {(0,0),(0,1),(1,0)}
P3 = {(0,0,0),(1,0,0),(0,1,0),(0,0,1)}
P4 = {(0,0,0,0),(1,0,0,0),(0,1,0,0),(0,0,1,0),(0,0,0,1),
(1,1,0,0),(1,0,1,0),(1,0,0,1),(0,1,1,0),(0,1,0,1),(0,0,1,1)}
5) Memoryless Steganalyzers: A memoryless steganalyzer,
g = {gn}∞n=1 is one where each gn is defined for y =
(y1, y2, . . . , yn) as,
gn(y) =
{
1, if ∃i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that g(yi) = 1
0, if g(yi) = 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
(6)
where g ∈ G1 is said to specify gn (and g). To denote a
steganalyzer sequence is memoryless the following notation
will be used g = {g}.
The analysis of the memoryless steganalyzer is motivated
by the current real world implementation of detection systems.
As an example we may consider each yi to be a digital image
sent via email. When sending n emails, the hider attaches one
of the yi’s to each message. The entire sequence of images
is considered to be y. Typically steganalyzers do not make
use of entire sequence y. Instead, each image is sequentially
processed by a given steganalyzer g, where if any of the yi
trigger the detector the entire sequence of emails is treated as
steganographic.
For a memoryless steganalyzer gn defined by g, the per-
missible set of gn is defined by the n-dimensional product of
Pg,
Pgn = Pg × Pg × · · · × Pg︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. (7)
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D. Channels
We now define two channels. The first models inherent
distortions occurring between the encoder and detection func-
tion, such as the compression of the stego-signal. The second
models a malicious attack by an active adversary such as
a cropping or additive noise. Both of these distortions are
considered to be outside the control of the encoder.
1) Encoder-Noise Channel: The encoder-noise channel is
denoted as Wn where Wn : Yn × Xn → [0, 1] and has the
following property for all x ∈ Xn,
Wn (y|x) := Pr {Y n = y|Xn = x} .
The channel represents the conditional probabilities of the
steganalyzer receiving y ∈ Yn when x ∈ Xn is sent.
The random variable, Y resulting from transmitting X
through the channel W will be denoted as X W→ Y .
We denote an arbitrary encoder-noise channel as the se-
quence of transition probabilities,
W := {W 1,W 2,W 3, . . .}.
2) Attack Channel: The attack function maps An : Yn →
Zn as,
An (z|y) = Pr {Zn = z|Y n = y} . (8)
The attack channel may be deterministic or probabilistic.
Similar to the encoder-noise channel, we denote an arbitrary
attack channel as the sequence of transition probabilities,
A := {A1, A2, A3, . . .}.
3) Encoder-Attack Channel: The encoder-attack channel or
channel is a function Qn : Xn → Zn, defined to model the
effect of both the encoder-noise and attack channel,
Qn (z|x) =
∑
y∈Yn
An (z|y)Wn (y|x) . (9)
The specification of Qn by An and Wn is denoted Qn =
An ◦Wn.
The arbitrary encoder-attack channel is a sequence of
transition probabilities,
Q = {Q1, Q2, Q3, . . .}. (10)
We will express the relation between the encoder-noise chan-
nel, attack channel and encoder-attack channel as Q = A◦W.
4) Memoryless Channels: In the case where channel dis-
tortions act independently and identically on each input letter
xi, we say it is a memoryless channel. In this instance the
n-length transition probabilities can be written as,
Wn (y|x) =
n∏
i=1
W (yi|xi), (11)
where W is said to define the channel. To denote a channel
is memoryless and defined by W we will write W = {W}.
E. Encoder and Decoder
The purpose of the encoder and decoder is to transmit
and receive information across a channel. The information to
be transferred is assumed to be from a uniformly distributed
message set denoted Mn, with a cardinality of Mn.
The encoding function maps a message to a stego-signal,
i.e. fn : Mn → Xn. The element of Xn to which the ith
message maps is called the codeword for i and is denoted, ui.
The collection of codewords, Cn = {u1, . . . ,uMn} is called
the code. The rate, Rn of an encoding function is given as
1
n
logMn.
The decoding function, φn : Zn →Mn, maps a corrupted
stego-signal to a message. The decoder is defined by the set of
decoding regions for the each message. The decoding regions,
D1, . . . ,DMn , are disjoint sets that cover Zn and defined such
that,
φ−1n ({m}) = Dm
:= {F ⊆ Zn : φn(z) = m, ∀ z ∈ F} ,
for m = 1, . . . ,Mn.
Next, two important terms are presented that allow for the
analysis of steganographic systems. The first is the probability
the decoder makes a mistake, called the probability of error.
The second is the probability the steganalyzer is triggered,
called the probability of detection. In both cases they are
calculated for a given code C = {u1, . . . ,uMn}, encoder-
channel Wn, attack-channel An and impermissible set Ign
(corresponding to some gn).
The probability of error in decoding the message can be
found as,
ǫn =
1
Mn
Mn∑
i=1
Qn (Dci |ui) , (12)
where Qn = An ◦Wn.
Similarly the probability of detection for the steganalyzer is
calculated as,
δn =
1
Mn
Mn∑
i=1
Wn (Ign |ui) . (13)
F. Stego-Channel
A steganographic channel or stego-channel is a triple
(W,g,A), where W is an arbitrary encoder-noise channel,
g is a steganalyzer sequence, and A is an arbitrary attack
channel. To reinforce the notion that a stego-channel is defined
by a sequence of triples we will typically write (W,g,A) =
{(Wn, gn, An)}∞n=1.
1) Discrete Stego-Channel: A discrete stego-channel is one
where at least one of the following holds:
|X | <∞, |Y| <∞, |Z| <∞, or |Pgn | <∞ ∀n.
2) Discrete Memoryless Stego-Channel: A discrete memo-
ryless stego-channel (DMSC) is a stego-channel where,
1) (W,g,A) is discrete
2) W is memoryless
3) g is memoryless
4) A is memoryless
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A DMSC is said to be defined by the triple (W, g,A) and
will be denoted (W,g,A) = {(W, g,A)}.
G. Steganographic Capacity
The secure capacity tells us how much information can
be transferred with arbitrarily low probabilities of error and
detection.
An (n,Mn, ǫn, δn)-code (for a given stego-channel) consists
of an encoder and decoder. The encoder and decoder are
capable of transferring one of Mn messages in n uses of the
channel with an average probability of error of less than (or
equal to) ǫn and a probability of detection of less than (or
equal to) δn.
1) Secure Capacity: A rate R is said to be securely achiev-
able for a stego-channel (W,g,A) = {(Wn, gn, An)}∞n=1, if
there exists a sequence of (n,Mn, ǫn, δn)-codes such that:
1) limn→∞ ǫn = 0
2) limn→∞ δn = 0
3) lim infn→∞ 1n logMn ≥ R
The secure capacity of a stego-channel (W,g,A) is de-
noted as C(W,g,A). This is defined as the supremum of all
securely achievable rates for (W,g,A).
H. (ǫ, δ)-Secure Capacity
A rate R is said to be (ǫ, δ)-securely achievable for a stego-
channel (W,g,A) = {(Wn, gn, An)}∞n=1, if there exists a
sequence of (n,Mn, ǫn, δn)-codes such that:
1) lim supn→∞ ǫn ≤ ǫ
2) lim supn→∞ δn ≤ δ
3) lim infn→∞ 1n logMn ≥ R
II. SECURE CAPACITY FORMULA
A. Information-Spectrum Methods
The information-spectrum method[6], [7], [8], [9], [10]
is a generalization of information theory created to apply
to systems where either the channel or its inputs are not
necessarily ergodic or stationary. Its use is required in this
work because the steganalyzer is not assumed to have any
ergodic or stationary properties.
The information-spectrum method uses the general source
(also called general sequence) defined as,
X :=
{
Xn = (X
(n)
1 , X
(n)
2 , . . . , X
(n)
n )
}∞
n=1
, (14)
where each X(n)m is a random variable defined over alphabet
X . It is important to note that the general source makes no
assumptions about consistency, ergodicity, or stationarity.
The information-spectrum method also uses two novel quan-
tities defined for sequences of random variables, called the
lim sup and lim inf in probability.
The limsup in probability of a sequence of random variables,
{Zn}∞n=1 is defined as,
p- lim supZn := inf
{
α : lim
n→∞
Pr {Zn > α} = 0
}
.
Similarly, the liminf in probability of a sequence of random
variables, {Zn}∞n=1 is,
p- lim inf Zn := sup
{
β : lim
n→∞
Pr {Zn < β} = 0
}
.
The spectral sup-entropy rate of a general source X =
{Xn}∞n=1 is defined as,
H(X) := p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
1
pXn(Xn)
. (15)
Analogously, the spectral inf-entropy rate of a general
source X = {Xn}∞n=1 is defined as,
H(X) := p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log
1
pXn(Xn)
. (16)
The spectral entropy rate has a number of natural properties
such as for any X, H(X) ≥ H(X) ≥ 0 [6, Thm. 1.7.2].
The spectral sup-mutual information rate for the pair of
general sequences (X,Y) = {(Xn, Y n)}∞n=1 is defined as,
I(X;Y) := p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
i(Xn;Y n), (17)
where,
i(Xn;Y n) := log
pY n|Xn(Y
n|Xn)
pY n(Y n)
. (18)
Likewise the spectral inf-mutual information rate for the
pair of general sequences (X,Y) = {(Xn, Y n)}∞n=1 is
defined as,
I(X;Y) := p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
i(Xn;Y n). (19)
B. Information-Spectrum Results
This section lists some of the fundamental results from
information-spectrum theory [6] that will be used in the
remainder of the paper.
H(X) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H (Xn) (20)
I(X;Y) ≤ H(Y) −H(Y|X) (21)
I(X;Y) ≥ H(X) −H(Y|X) (22)
C. Secure Sequences
1) Secure Input Sequences: For a given stego-channel
(W,g,A), a general source X = {Xn}∞n=1 is called δ-secure
if the resulting Y = {Y n}∞n=1 satisfies,
lim sup
n→∞
Pr {gn(Y n) = 1} ≤ δ, (23)
or either of the following equivalent conditions,
lim sup
n→∞
pY n(Ign) ≤ δ, (24)
or
lim inf
n→∞
pY n(Pgn) ≥ 1− δ. (25)
The set, Sδ, of all general sources that are δ-secure is
defined as,
Sδ :=
{
X : lim sup
n→∞
∑
x∈Xn
Wn (Ign |x) pXn(x) ≤ δ
}
, (26)
where X = {Xn}∞n=1.
The set for δ = 0 is called secure input set and denoted S0.
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2) Secure Output Sequences: For a given steganalyzer
sequence g = {gn}∞n=1, a general sequence Y = {Y n}∞n=1 is
called δ-secure if,
lim sup
n→∞
Pr {gn(Y n) = 1} ≤ δ, (27)
The set, Tδ, of all δ-secure general output sequences is defined
as,
Tδ :=
{
Y = {Y n}∞n=1 : lim sup
n→∞
pY n(Ign) ≤ δ
}
. (28)
The set for δ = 0 is called secure output set and denoted T0.
D. (ǫ, δ)-Secure Capacity
We are now prepared to derive the first fundamental result-
the (ǫ, δ)-Secure Capacity. This capacity will make use of the
following definition,
J (R|X) := lim sup
n→∞
Pr
{
1
n
i(Xn;Zn) ≤ R
}
= lim sup
n→∞
Pr
{
1
n
log
Qn (Zn|Xn)
pZn(Zn)
≤ R
}
.
The proof is the general ǫ-capacity proof given by Han[6],
[7], with the restriction to the secure input set.
Theorem 2.1 ((ǫ, δ)-Secure Capacity): The (ǫ, δ)-secure
capacity C(ǫ, δ|W,g,A) of a stego-channel (W,g,A) is
given by,
C(ǫ, δ|W,g,A) = sup
X∈Sδ
sup {R : J (R|X) ≤ ǫ} , (29)
for any 0 ≤ ǫ < 1 and 0 ≤ δ < 1.
Proof: This proof is based on [6], [7]. Let C =
supX∈Sδ sup {R : J (R|X) ≤ ǫ}, and Qn = An ◦Wn.
Achievability: Choose any ǫ ≥ 0 and δ > 0.
Let R = C − 3γ, for any γ > 0. By the definition of C we
have that there exists an X ∈ Sδ such that,
sup{R : J (R|X) ≤ ǫ} ≥ C − γ = R+ 2γ. (30)
Similarly we may find an R′ > R+γ such that J (R′|X) ≤ ǫ.
As J (R|X) is monotonically increasing,
J (R+ γ|X) ≤ ǫ. (31)
Next by letting Mn = enR we have that,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn ≥ R.
Using Feinstein’s Lemma[11] we have that there exists an
(n,Mn, ǫn)-code with,
ǫn ≤ Pr
{
1
n
log
Qn (Zn|Xn)
pZn(Zn)
≤ 1
n
logMn + γ
}
+ e−nγ .
(32)
As 1
n
logMn = R for all n we have,
ǫn ≤ Pr
{
1
n
log
Qn (Zn|Xn)
pZn(Zn)
≤ R+ γ
}
+ e−nγ . (33)
Taking the lim sup of each side we have,
lim sup
n→∞
ǫn ≤ J (R+ γ|X) , (34)
with J (R+ γ|X) ≤ ǫ shows that lim supn→∞ ǫn ≤ ǫ.
Finally since X ∈ Sδ we have that,
lim sup
n→∞
pZn(Ign) ≤ δ. (35)
Converse: Let R > C, and choose γ > 0 such that R −
2γ > C. Assume that R is (ǫ, δ)-achievable, so there exists
an (n,Mn, ǫn, δn)-code such that,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn ≥ R, (36)
lim sup
n→∞
ǫn ≤ ǫ, (37)
and
lim sup
n→∞
δn ≤ δ. (38)
Let X = {Xn}∞n=1 where each Xn is a uniform distribution
over codewords Cn, and let Z be the corresponding channel
output. Since R− 2γ > C ≥ sup{R : J (R|X) ≤ ǫ},
J (R− 2γ|X) > ǫ. (39)
The Feinstein Dual [6], [7] states that for a uniformly
distributed input Xn over a (n,Mn, ǫn)-code and output Zn
corresponding to channel Q, the following holds for all n,
ǫn ≥ Pr
{
1
n
log
Qn (Zn|Xn)
pZn(Zn)
≤ 1
n
logMn − γ
}
− e−nγ
(40)
Using the property of lim inf we have that for all n > n0
that,
1
n
logMn ≥ R − γ. (41)
For n > n0 we have,
ǫn ≥ Pr
{
1
n
log
Qn (Zn|Xn)
pZn(Zn)
≤ R− 2γ
}
− e−nγ . (42)
Taking the lim sup of both sides, and considering (39), we
see that,
lim sup
n→∞
ǫn > ǫ. (43)
A fundamental assumption in the above proof is that the
encoder has a knowledge of the detection function. From
a steganalysis perspective this allows one to determine the
“worst-case scenario” for the amount of information that may
be sent through a channel.
E. Secure Capacity
The next result deals with a special case of (ǫ, δ)-secure
capacity, namely the one where ǫ = δ = 0. The secure
capacity is the maximum amount of information that may be
sent over a channel with arbitrarily small probabilities of error
and detection.
The four potential formulations for our model are shown
in Figure 3. The capacity of the stego-channel (W,g,A) is
shown in Theorem 2.2 to follow and specialized to the other
cases in Theorems 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5.
The results of these capacities are summarized in Table II.
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Fig. 3. Stegochannels
Theorem 2.2 (Secure Capacity): The secure capacity
C(W,g,A) of a stego-channel (W,g,A) is given by,
C(W,g,A) = sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z). (44)
Proof: We apply Theorem 2.1 with ǫ = 0 and δ = 0.
This gives,
C(W,g,A)
= C(0, 0|W,g,A) (45a)
= sup
X∈S0
sup {R : J (R|X) ≤ 0} (45b)
= sup
X∈S0
sup
[
R : lim sup
n→∞
Pr
{
1
n
i(Xn;Zn) ≤ R
}
≤ 0
]
(45c)
= sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z) (45d)
Here the last line is due to the definition of p- lim inf .
Theorem 2.3 (Noiseless Encoder, Active Adversary): The
secure capacity of a stego-channel, (·,g,A), with a noiseless-
encoder and active adversary, denoted C(·,g,A), is given
by,
C(·,g,A) = sup
Y∈T0
I(Y;Z). (46)
Proof: Apply Theorem 2.2 with X = Y and S0 = T0.
Theorem 2.4 (Passive Adversary): The secure channel ca-
pacity with a passive adversary, denoted C(W,g) of a stego-
channel (W,g, ·) is given by,
C(W,g) = sup
X∈S0
I(X;Y). (47)
Proof: Since the adversary is passive, we have that Z =
Y.
Theorem 2.5 (Noiseless Encoder, Passive Adversary):
The secure capacity of a stego-channel (·,g, ·), with a
noiseless-encoder and passive adversary, denoted C(·,g), is
given by,
C(·,g) = sup
X∈S0
I(X;Y). (48)
Proof: Since the adversary is passive, we have that Z =
Y, and since there is no encoder noise we have that X = Y
and S0 = T0.
TABLE II
SECURE CAPACITY FORMULAS
Secure Capacity Noise Attack Thm.
C(W,g,A) = sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z) W A 2.2
C(·,g,A) = sup
Y∈T0
I(Y;Z) Noiseless A 2.3
C(W, g) = sup
X∈S0
I(X;Y) W Passive 2.4
C(·,g) = sup
Y∈T0
H(Y) Noiseless Passive 2.5
F. Strong Converse
A stego-channel (W,g,A) is said to satisfy the ǫ-strong
converse property if for any R > C(0, δ|W,g,A), every
(n,Mn, ǫn, δn)-code with,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn ≥ R,
and
lim sup
n→∞
δn ≤ δ,
we have,
lim
n→∞
ǫn = 1.
If a channel satisfies the ǫ-strong converse,
C(ǫ, δ|W,g,A) = C(0, δ|W,g,A), (49)
for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1).
Theorem 2.6 (ǫ-Strong Converse): A stego-channel
(W,g,A) satisfies the ǫ-strong converse property (for
a fixed δ) if and only if,
sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z) = sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z). (50)
This proof is essentially the ǫ-strong converse[6], [7] with a
restriction to the secure input set. See details in Appendix A
G. Bounds
We now derive a number of useful bounds on the spectral-
entropy of an output sequence in relation to the permissible
set. These bounds will then be used to prove general bounds
for steganographic systems and see further application in
Chapter III.
Theorem 2.7 (Spectral inf-entropy bound): For a discrete
g = {Pn}∞n=1 with corresponding secure output set T0,
sup
Y∈T0
H(Y) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Pn| (51)
See Appendix B for proof.
Theorem 2.8 (Spectral sup-entropy bound): For discrete
g = {Pn}∞n=1 with corresponding secure output set T0,
sup
Y∈T0
H(Y) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Pn| (52)
See Appendix C for proof.
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H. Capacity Bounds
This section present a number of fundamental bounds on
the secure capacity of a stego-channel based on the properties
of that channel.
We make use of the following lemma,
Lemma 2.1: For a stego-channel (W,g,A) the following
hold,
I(X;Z) ≤ I(X;Y), (53)
I(X;Z) ≤ I(Y;Z). (54)
Proof: We note that the general distributions form a
Markov chain, X → Y → Z1. A property of the inf-
information rate[7] is,
I(X;Z) ≤ I(X;Y), (55)
when X→ Y → Z.
Since X→ Y → Z implies Z→ Y → X we also have,
I(X;Z) ≤ I(Y;Z). (56)
The first capacity bound gives an upperbound based on the
sup-entropy of the secure input set.
Theorem 2.9 (Input Sup-Entropy Bound): For a stego-
channel (W,g,A) the secure capacity is bounded as,
C(W,g,A) ≤ sup
X∈S0
H(X) (57)
Proof: Using (21) and the property that H(X|Z) ≥ 0 we
have,
C(W,g,A)
(T2.2)
= sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z)
(21)≤ sup
X∈S0
{
H(X)−H(X|Z)}
≤ sup
X∈S0
H(X)
The next theorem gives two upper bounds on the capacity
based on the sup-entropy of the secure input and output sets.
Theorem 2.10 (Output Sup-Entropy Bounds): For a stego-
channel (W,g,A) the secure capacity is bounded as,
C(W,g,A) ≤ sup
X∈S0
H(Y) (59a)
≤ sup
Y∈T0
H(Y) (59b)
Proof: Using (21) and the property that H(Z|X) ≥ 0 we
have,
C(W,g,A) = sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z)
(L2.1)≤ sup
X∈S0
I(X;Y)
(21)≤ sup
X∈S0
{
H(Y)−H(Y|X)}
≤ sup
X∈S0
H(Y)
≤ sup
Y∈T0
H(Y)
1X → Y → Z is said to hold when for all n, Xn and Zn are conditionally
independent given Y n.
Here the final line follows since if X ∈ S0 and X W→ Y then
Y ∈ T0.
The next corollary specializes the above theorem when the
permissible set is finite.
Corallary 2.1 (Discrete Permissible Set Bound):
For a given discrete stego-channel (W,g,A) =
{(Wn,Pgn , An)}∞n=1 the secure capacity is bounded
from above as,
C(W,g,A) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | (61)
Proof: Combining Theorem 2.8 and line (59b) of Theo-
rem 2.10 gives the desired result.
The next theorem provides an intuitive result dealing with
the capacity of two stego-channels having related steganalyz-
ers.
Theorem 2.11 (Permissible Set Relation): For two stego-
channels, (W,g,A) and (W,v,A) if Pgn ⊆ Pvn for all
but finitely many n, then,
C(W,g,A) ≤ C(W,v,A). (62)
Proof: Let {fn}∞n=1 and {φn}∞n=1 be a sequence of
encoding and decoding functions that achieves C(W,g,A).
Such a sequence exists by the definition of secure capacity.
The following definitions will be used for i = 1, . . . ,Mn,
ui = fn(i),
Di = φ−1n ({i}) .
The probability of error for this sequence is given by (12),
ǫn =
1
Mn
Mn∑
i=1
Qn (Dci |ui) ,
where Qn = An ◦Wn.
This value is independent of the permissible sets and if
ǫn → 0 for the stego-channel (W,g,A) then it also goes
to zero for (W,v,A).
Next we know that the probability of detection for
(W,g,A) is given by (13),
δgn =
1
Mn
Mn∑
i=1
Wn (Ign |ui) ,
and that δgn → 0.
Since Pgn ⊆ Pvn for all n > N , we have that, Ign ⊇ Ivn
if n > N and,
Wn (Ign |x) ≥Wn (Ivn |x) , ∀n > N,x ∈ Xn. (63)
Using this, we may bound the probability of detection for
(W,v,A) and n > N as,
δvn =
1
Mn
Mn∑
i=1
Wn (Ivn |ui)
(63)≤ 1
Mn
Mn∑
i=1
Wn (Ign |ui)
=δgn
Since δgn → 0 we see that δvn → 0 as well.
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Detection g
Encoder Decoder
Detection v
Noise
W n (y|x)
gn(y) vn(y)
φn(y)fn(m)
Fig. 4. Composite steganalyzer
Noise A Noise B
Detection g Detection v
gn(y)
A(y|x) B(z|y)
vn(z)
Fig. 5. Two Noise Channel
I. Applications
1) Composite steganalyzers: The final theorem of the previ-
ous section is intuitively pleasing and leads to some immediate
results. An example of this is the composite steganalyzer
pictured in Figure 4.
In this system, two steganalyzers, g and v are used sequen-
tially on the corrupted stego-signal. If either of these stegana-
lyzers are triggered, the message is considered steganographic.
We will denote the composite stego-channel of this system as
(W,h,A).
As one would expect, the capacity of the composite
channel, C(W,h,A), is smaller than either C(W,g,A) or
C(W,v,A). This is shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.12 (Composite Stego-Channel): For a compos-
ite stego-channel (W,h,A) defined by g and v, the following
inequality holds,
C(W,h,A) ≤ min {C(W,g,A), C(W,v,A)} . (65)
Proof: We first show that C(W,h,A) ≤ C(W,g,A).
The permissible set of the composite is equal to the inter-
section of the base detection functions,
Phn = Pgn ∩ Pvn , ∀n, (66)
thus we have that Phn ⊆ Pgn and we may apply Theorem 2.11
to state,
C(W,h,A) ≤ C(W,g,A).
The above argument may be applied using Phn ⊆ Pvn to
show C(W,h,A) ≤ C(W,v,A).
2) Two Noise Systems: We briefly present and discuss an
interesting case that is somewhat counter-intuitive. Consider
the channel shown in Figure 5. In this case there is distortion
A after the encoder and a second distortion B before the
second steganalyzer. In the previous section it was shown
that in the composite steganalyzer the addition of a second
steganalyzer (Figure 5) lowers the capacity of the stego-
channel. A surprising result for the two noise system is that
this may not be the case. In fact, the addition of a second
distortion may increase the capacity of a stego-channel!
DecoderEncoder
Mˆn
Xn = Y n = Zn
Detection
gn(y)
φn(z)fn(m)Mn
Fig. 6. Noiseless Stego-Channel
To see this, consider the two steganalyzers g and v. Assume
that g classifies signals with positive means as stegano-
graphic, while v classifies signals with negative means as
steganographic. If these detection functions were in series,
the permissible set (of the composite detection function)
is empty. This is because a signal cannot have a positive
and negative mean. Now consider a specific, deterministic
distortion Bn(−y|y) = 1. Now we may send any signal we
wish, as long as its mean is positive. So in some instances, it
is possible for the addition of a distortion to actually increase
the capacity.
III. NOISELESS CHANNELS
This section investigates the capacity of the noiseless stego-
channel shown in Figure 6. In this system there is no encoder-
noise and the adversary is passive. This means that not only
does the decoder receive exactly what the encoder sends, but
the steganalyzer does as well.
This section finds the secure capacity of this system, and
then derives a number of intuitive bounds relating to this
capacity.
A. Secure Noiseless Capacity
Theorem 3.1 (Secure Noiseless Capacity): For a discrete
noiseless channel (·,g, ·) the secure capacity is given by,
C(·,g) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | (67)
Proof: The proof follows directly from Theorem 2.5 and
Theorem 2.7.
Example 2 (Capacity of the Sum Steganalyzer): We now
use this result to find the secure noiseless capacity of the
sum steganalyzer of Example 1. The size of the permissible
set for n is equal to the number of different ways we may
arrange up to ⌊n/2⌋ 1s into n positions.
|Pgn | =
∑
i:0≤i≤⌊ n2 ⌋
(
n
i
)
. (68)
For n even |Pgn | = 2n−1 + 12
(
n
n/2
)
and for n odd,
|Pgn | = 2n−1. Applying the noiseless Theorem,
C(·,g) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | = lim
n→∞
1
n
log 2n−1
= 1bit/use. (69a)
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B. ǫ-Strong Converse for Noiseless Channels
We now present a fundamental result for discrete noiseless
channels regarding the ǫ-strong converse property. It gives
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a noiseless stego-
channel to satisfy the ǫ-strong converse property.
Theorem 3.2 (Noiseless ǫ-Strong Converse): A discrete
noiseless stego-channel (·,g, ·) satisfies the ǫ-strong converse
property if and only if,
C(·,g) = lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | . (70)
Proof: Since the channel is noiseless, X = Y = Z we
have,
sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z) = sup
Y∈T0
H(Y), (71)
sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z) = sup
Y∈T0
H(Y). (72)
First assume that the stego-channel satisfies the ǫ-strong
converse property. This gives,
sup
Y∈T0
H(Y)
(71)
= sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z) (73a)
(T2.6)
= sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z) (73b)
(72)
= sup
Y∈T0
H(Y) (73c)
The capacity is then,
C(·,g) (T2.5)= sup
Y∈T0
H(Y)
(T2.7)
= lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn |
(73c)
= sup
Y∈T0
H(Y)
(T2.8)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn |
= lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn |
Here the final line results as the lim inf and lim sup coincide.
For the other direction assume that C(·,g) =
limn→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | which gives,
C(·,g) = sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z)
(T2.5)
= sup
Y∈T0
H(Y)
= lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn |
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn |
(T2.8)
= sup
Y∈T0
H(Y)
(72)
= sup
X∈S0
I(X;Z)
Thus, supX∈S0 I(X;Z) = supX∈S0 I(X;Z) and by The-
orem 2.6 the stego-channel satisfies the ǫ-strong-converse
property.
Example 3 (Sum Steganalyzer): We now determine if the
sum steganalyzer satisfies the ǫ-strong converse.
From Example 2 the size of the permissible set is,
|Pgn | =

 2n−1 + 12
(
n
n/2
)
, for even n
2n−1, for odd n
(75)
We will make use of Stirling’s approximation,
n! =
√
2πnn+
1
2 e−n+λn , (76)
where 1/(12n+ 1) < λn < 1/(12n).
For n even,
|Pgn | = 2n−1 +
1
2
n!
(n− 12n)!(12n)!
(77)
= 2n−1 +
1
2
√
2πnn+
1
2 e−n+λn(√
2π(n/2)
n
2
+ 1
2 e−
n
2
+λn/2
)2 (78)
≤ 2n−1
(
1 +
2e√
2πn
)
(79)
This gives,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn |
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log
(
2n−1
(
1 +
2e√
2πn
))
(80)
=1 (81)
This shows,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | = 1 ≥ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | . (82)
Since the liminf and limsup coincide, the limit is indeed a true
one and this stego-channel satisfies the ǫ-strong converse.
C. Properties of the Noiseless DMSC
In this section we briefly investigate the secure capacity of
the discrete memoryless stego-channel (cf. I-F2).
Theorem 3.3 (Noiseless DMSC Secure Capacity): For the
stego-channel (·,g, ·) with g = {g}, the secure capacity is
given by,
C(·,g) = log |Pg| , (83)
and furthermore this stego-channel satisfies the strong
converse.
Proof: As the channel is noiseless and the input alphabet
is finite we may use Theorem 3.1,
C(·,g) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | . (84)
Note that by (7) we have for all n,
1
n
log |Pgn | =
1
n
log
∣∣∣∣∣∣Pg × Pg × · · · × Pg︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
n
log |Pg|n
= log |Pg| .
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Attack
Nna
φn(z)
Xn Y n = Xn +Nne
fn(m)
gn(y)
Zn = Y n +Nna
Nne
Fig. 7. Additive Noise Channel Active Adversary
Thus,
C(·,g) = log |Pg| . (85)
We also have that
C(·,g) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | = log |Pg| = lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | ,
(86)
thus by Theorem 3.2 the stego-channel satisfies the strong
converse.
IV. ADDITIVE NOISE STEGO-CHANNELS
In this section we evaluate the capacity of particular stego-
channel, shown in Figure 7. In this channel, both the encoder-
noise and attack-noise are additive and independent from the
channel input.
A. Additive Noise
Denote the sum of two general sequences X =
{Xn = (X(n)1 , . . . , X(n)n )}∞n=1, and Y = {Y n =
(Y
(n)
1 , . . . , Y
(n)
n )}∞n=1 as,
X+Y := {Xn+Y n = (X(n)1 +Y (n)1 , . . . , X(n)n +Y (n)n )}∞n=1.
(87)
Letting the encoder-noise be denoted as Ne = {Nne }∞n=1
and the attack-noise denoted as Na = {Nna }∞n=1 we have the
following relations,
Y = X+Ne
Z = Y +Na = X+Ne +Na = X+N
where N = {Nn}∞n=1 = Ne +Na.
As noises are independent from the stego-signal, we may
use the following simplifications,
pZn|Xn(X
n +Nn|Xn) = pNn(Nn),
leading to the following simplifications in spectral-entropies,
H(Z|X) = H(N), (88)
H(Z|X) = H(N). (89)
We now use these simplifications to present a useful capac-
ity result for additive noise channels.
Theorem 4.1: For additive noise stego-channel defined with
Ne+Na = N, if N satisfies the strong converse (i.e. H(N) =
H(N)) then the capacity is,
C(W,g,A) = sup
X∈S0
{H(Z)} −H(N) (90)
Attack
Encoder
Noise
Decoder
Detection
φn(y)fn(m)
gn(y)N (0, σ2e) N (0, σ2a)
Fig. 8. AWGN Channel Active Adversary
Proof: First we find a lower bound as,
C(W,g,A)
(22)≥ sup
X∈S0
{
H(Z)−H(Z|X)} (91)
(88)
= sup
X∈S0
{H(Z)} −H(N) (92)
Next we upperbound the capacity as,
C(W,g,A)
(21)≤ sup
X∈S0
{H(Z)−H(Z|X)} (93)
(89)
= sup
X∈S0
{H(Z)} −H(N) (94)
By assumption H(N) = H(N) and combining (92)
and (94) we have the desired result.
B. AWGN Example
The general formula of the previous section is now ap-
plied to the commonly found additive white Gaussian noise
channel. The detector is motivated by the use of spread
spectrum steganography[12], or more generally stochastic
modulation[13].
The encoder-noise and attack-channel to be considered are
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). For a stego-signal,
x = (x1, . . . , xn), the corrupted stego-signal is given by,
y = (x1 + n1, . . . , xn + nn),
where each ni ∼ N (0, σ2e), and all are independent.
The transition probabilities of the encoder-noise are given
by,
Wn (y|x) = 1
(2πσ2e)
n
2
exp
{
− 1
2σ2e
n∑
i=1
(yi − xi)2
}
. (95)
Similarly, the attack-channel is AWGN as N (0, σ2a) so the
transition probabilities are,
An (z|y) = 1
(2πσ2a)
n
2
exp
{
− 1
2σ2a
n∑
i=1
(zi − yi)2
}
. (96)
1) Variance Steganalyzer: In stochastic modulation, a
pseudo-noise is modulated by a message and added to the
cover-signal. This is done as the presence of noise in signal
processing applications is a common occurrence.
If the passive adversary has knowledge of the distribution
of the cover-signal and suspects stochastic modulation, they
would expect the variance of a stego-signal will differ from
a cover-signal. If the passive adversary knows the variance
of the cover-distribution, they could design a steganalyzer to
trigger if the variance of a test signal is higher than expected.
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For example when testing the signal y = (y1, . . . , yn) the
variance steganalyzer operates as,
gn(y) =
{
1, if 1
n
∑n
i=1 y
2
i > c
0, else (97)
That is to say, if the empirical variance of a test signal is
above a certain threshold, the signal is considered stegano-
graphic.
2) Additive Gaussian Channel Active Adversary: In this
section we derive the capacity under an active adversary.
Assume that the adversary uses an additive i.i.d. Gaussian
noise with variance σ2a while the encoder noise is additive
i.i.d. Gaussian with σ2e .
Let Ne = {Ne}2 where Ne ∼ N (0, σ2e) and Na = {Na}
where Na ∼ N (0, σ2a).
Let N = Ne + Na = {Nn = Nne + Nna }∞n=1. Since both
Ne and Na are i.i.d. as N (0, σ2e) and N (0, σ2a), respectively,
their sum is i.i.d. as N (0, σ2e + σ2a), i.e. N = {N} with N ∼
N (0, σ2e + σ2a).
Since N = {N} with N ∼ N (0, σ2e + σ2a) we have the
following relations,
H(N) = H(N) = H(N) =
1
2
log 2πe
(
σ2a + σ
2
e
)
. (98)
Since H(N) = H(N) we see that the noise sequence
satisfies the strong converse property.
3) Active Adversary Capacity: We now derive the secure
capacity of the above stego-channel. Since the noises are i.i.d.,
the general sequence N will satisfy the strong converse and
allow the use of Theorem 4.1.
The formal proof is then followed by a discussion of the
results and a description using the classic sphere packing
intuition.
Theorem 4.2: For the stego-channel (W,g,A) =
{(Wn, gn, An)}∞n=1 with Wn and An defined by (95)
and (96) respectively, and gn defined by (97) the secure
capacity is,
C(W,g,A) =
1
2
log
c+ σ2a
σ2e + σ
2
a
. (99)
Proof: From Theorem 4.1 and (98) we have,
C(W,g,A) = sup
X∈S0
{H(Z)} −H(N) (100)
= sup
X∈S0
{H(Z)} − 1
2
log 2πe
(
σ2a + σ
2
e
)
. (101)
Achievability:
Let X = {X} where X ∼ N (0, c−σ2e). Thus Y = X+Ne =
{Y } with Y = X+Ne. By addition of independent Gaussians,
Y ∼ N (0, c). This gives,
Pr
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
Y
(n)
i
)2
> c
}
→ 0, (102)
2Recall that for a general sequence, X = {Xn = (X(n)1 , . . . ,X
(n)
n )}
∞
n=1
when X = {X} is written it means that each X(n)
i
is independent and
identically distributed as X .
and we see that X ∈ S0. Similarly, Z = Na + Y = {Z}
with Z = X + Ne + Na. Again by addition of independent
Gaussians we have Z ∼ N (0, c+ σ2a).
This allows for a lower bound of,
C(W,g,A)
(101)
= sup
X∈S0
H(Z)− 1
2
log
(
2πe(σ2e + σ
2
a)
) (103a)
≥H(Z)− 1
2
log
(
2πe(σ2e + σ
2
a)
) (103b)
=
1
2
log
c+ σ2a
σ2e + σ
2
a
(103c)
Converse:
To find the upperbound we will make use of a number of
simple lemmas:
Lemma 4.1: For a given stego-channel with secure input
distribution set S0 and secure output distribution set T0, the
following holds,
sup
X∈S0
H(Z) ≤ sup
Y∈T0
H(Z). (104)
Proof: By definition for any X ∈ S0 and X W→ Y, we
have Y ∈ T0.
Lemma 4.2: For Y n = (Y (n)1 , Y
(n)
2 , . . . , Y
(n)
n ) let K(n)ij
be the covariance between Y (n)i and Y
(n)
j , that is K
(n)
ij :=
E
{
Y
(n)
i Y
(n)
j
}
. For the stego-channel defined above, if Y =
{Y n}∞n=1 ∈ T0 we have for any γ > 0 there exists some N
such that for all n > N ,
1
n
n∑
i=1
K
(n)
ii + σ
2
a < c+ σ
2
a + γ. (105)
Proof: It suffices to show,
1
n
n∑
i=1
K
(n)
ii < c+ γ, (106)
for all n greater than some N .
To show this, assume that no such N exists, thus we have
a subsequence nk such that,
1
nk
nk∑
i=1
K
(nk)
ii ≥ c+ γ. (107)
This means that,
1
nk
nk∑
i=1
K
(nk)
ii = E
{
1
nk
nk∑
i=1
y2i
}
≥ c+ γ,
which in turn implies that,
Pr {gnk(Y nk) = 0} → 0.
This is a contradiction as it shows Y = {Y n}∞n=1 /∈ T0.
Lemma 4.3: For any Zn = (Z1, . . . , Zn) with Cij =
E {ZiZj},
H(Zn) ≤ 1
2
log(2πe)n
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Cii
)n
. (108)
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Proof: From [14, Chap. 9.6] we have,
H(Zn) ≤ 1
2
log(2πe)n
n∏
i=1
Cii. (109)
The result follows from application of the arithmetic-geometric
inequality.
Lemma 4.4: For the above stego-channel, any Y ∈ T0 and
any ǫ > 0 we have,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Zn) <
1
2
log 2πe(c+ σ2a) + ǫ, (110)
where Z = {Zn}∞n=1 and Y A→ Z.
Proof: Let any ǫ > 0 be given and choose γ > 0 such
that,
γ ≤ (c+ σ2a)
(
e2ǫ − 1) ,
this gives,
1
2
log 2πe
(
c+ σ2a + γ
) ≤ 1
2
log 2πe(c+ σ2a) + ǫ. (111)
Letting C(n)ij = E
{
Z
(n)
i Z
(n)
j
}
and K(n)ij = E
{
Y
(n)
i Y
(n)
j
}
we note that Z(n)i = Y
(n)
i +Na. This gives,
C
(n)
ii = K
(n)
ii + σ
2
a. (112)
This gives,
1
n
H(Zn)
(L4.3)≤ 1
2n
log(2πe)n
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
C
(n)
ii
)n
(113)
(112)
=
1
2n
log(2πe)n
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
K
(n)
ii + σ
2
a
)n
(114)
(L4.2)
<
1
2n
log(2πe)n
(
c+ σ2a + γ
)n (115)
(111)≤ 1
2
log 2πe(c+ σ2a) + ǫ (116)
The inequality of (115) holds for all but a finite number of n
by Lemma 4.2.
We now show the upperbound:
Beginning with the specialization of Theorem 4.1,
C(W,g,A)
(101)
= sup
X∈S0
{H(Z)} − 1
2
log 2πe(σ2e + σ
2
a) (117a)
(L4.1)≤ sup
Y∈T0
{H(Z)} − 1
2
log 2πe(σ2e + σ
2
a)
(117b)
(20)≤ sup
Y∈T0
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Zn)
− 1
2
log 2πe(σ2e + σ
2
a) (117c)
(L4.4)
<
1
2
log
c+ σ2a
σ2e + σ
2
a
+ ǫ (117d)
Combining (103c) and (117d) we have for any ǫ > 0,
1
2
log
c+ σ2a
σ2e + σ
2
a
≤ C(W,g,A) < 1
2
log
c+ σ2a
σ2e + σ
2
a
+ ǫ,
and we see that C(W,g,A) = 12 log
c+σ2a
σ2e+σ
2
a
.
TABLE III
GAUSSIAN ADDITIVE NOISE CAPACITIES
Channel Secure Capacity Encoder Noise Attack Noise
C(W,g,A) 1
2
log
c+σ2a
σ2e+σ
2
a
σ2e σ
2
a
C(W, g) 1
2
log c
σ2e
σ2e 0
C(·, g,A) 1
2
log
c+σ2a
σ2a
0 σ2
a
C(·,g) lim
σ2→0
1
2
log c+σ
2
2σ2
0 0
4) Noise Cases: We now use this theorem to investigate
the behavior of the capacity under different noise conditions.
5) Large Attack Case: We first consider the case where σ2a
is much larger than both c and σ2e . This gives,
C(W,g,A) =
1
2
log
c+ σ2a
σ2e + σ
2
a
≈ 1
2
log
σ2a
σ2a
= 0.
This shows that when the attack noise is large enough, the
capacity of the stego-channel goes to zero. Intuitively this is
due to the fact that the variance steganalyzer places a power
constraint (of c) on any signals it allows to pass. If the attack
noise is much larger than c, a message simply cannot be
transmitted with enough power to overcome that noise and
ǫn → 0 is impossible.
6) Large Encoder-Noise Case: Next we consider the case
where σ2e ≥ c.
Since c+σ
2
a
σ2e+σ
2
a
≤ 1, we have log c+σ2a
σ2e+σ
2
a
≤ 0. This gives,
C(W,g,A) =
1
2
log
c+ σ2a
σ2e + σ
2
a
≤ 0
As capacity is always greater or equal to zero, we see that
the capacity of this system is indeed zero. This is because no
matter what codeword is sent, the encoder-noise will corrupt
it into the impermissible set and the steganalyzer will be
triggered, that is δn → 0 is impossible.
This case illuminates the importance of the additional
constraint in communication over a stego-channel, as even if
ǫ→ 0 the capacity of the stego-channel is still zero.
7) Noiseless Case: Consider the noiseless case where σ2e =
σ2a = σ
2 and σ2 → 0. This gives,
lim
σ2→0
C(W,g,A) = lim
σ2→0
1
2
log
c+ σ2
σ2 + σ2
=∞.
Since the channel is noiseless and the permissible set size is
infinite (as well as input and output alphabets), the capacity
is unbounded.
8) Geometric Intuition: In this section we present some
geometric intuition to the previous results, similar to the case
of the classic additive Gaussian noise[14], [15].
We will consider the case of only an encoder-noise of σ2,
shown in Figure 9.
From the above theorem we see that,
C(W,g) =
1
2
log
c
σ2
. (118)
The most basic element will be the volume of an n
dimensional sphere of radius r. In this case, the volume is
equal to Anrn where An is a constant dependent only on the
dimension n.
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Decoder
Noise
Encoder
Detection
φn(y)fn(m)
gn(y)N (0, σ2)
Fig. 9. AWGN Channel Passive Adversary
The fundamental question is: what is the capacity of the
stego-channel, or how many codewords can we reliably and
safely use? To answer this, we must consider the two con-
straints on a secure system: error probability and detection
probability.
9) Error Probability: Since we have that Xn = Yn = ℜn,
we may view each codeword as a point in ℜn. When we
transmit a given codeword, we may think of the addition of
noise as moving the point around in that space. As the power
of the noise is σ2, the probability that the received codeword
has moved more than
√
nσ2 away from where it started goes
to zero as n → ∞. This means a received codeword will
likely be contained in a sphere of radius
√
nσ2 centered on
the transmitted codeword. If we receive a signal inside such
a sphere, it is likely that the transmitted codeword was the
center of that sphere. In this manner we can define a coding
system by choosing the codewords such that their spheres do
not overlap. This results in no confusion during decoding and
achieves the requirement of vanishing error probability.
10) Detection Probability: We begin by looking at the
permissible set. The permissible set for our gn is given by,
Pgn = {y ∈ Yn :
n∑
i=1
y2i < nc}. (119)
Clearly the permissible set is a sphere of radius
√
nc centered
at the origin. If a test signal falls inside this sphere it is
classified as non-steganographic, whereas if it is outside it is
considered steganographic.
The second criteria for a secure system is that the probability
of detection goes to zero. If we were to place each codeword
such that its sphere was inside the permissible set, we know
that the probability of detection will go to zero.
11) Capacity: From the above, we know that the codeword
spheres cannot overlap (to ensure no errors). We also know
that all the codeword spheres must fit inside the permissible
set (to ensure no detection). If we calculate the number of non-
overlapping spheres we may pack into the permissible set, we
will have a general idea of the number of codewords we can
use.
Since the volume of the permissible set is An(nc)
n
2 and the
volume of each codeword sphere is An(nσ2)
n
2 , we can place
approximately,
An(nc)
n
2
An(nσ2)
n
2
=
( c
σ2
)n
2
,
non-overlapping sphere inside the permissible set.
Using the center of each sphere as a codeword, we have
Mn codewords where Mn =
(
c
σ2
)n
2
.
If we consider the capacity as C(W,g) = lim 1
n
logMn
we have,
C(W,g) = lim
1
n
log
( c
σ2
)n
2 (120a)
=
1
2
log
c
σ2
, (120b)
which agrees with the result of Theorem 4.2.
V. PREVIOUS WORK REVISITED
A. Cachin Perfect Security
In Cachin’s definition of perfect security[16], the cover-
signal distribution and the stego-signal distribution are each
required to be independent and identically distributed. This
gives the following secure-input set,
S0 =
{
X = {X} : lim
n→∞
1
n
D (Sn||Xn) = 0
}
. (121)
The i.i.d. property means that D (Sn||Xn) = nD (S||X)
so we see that the above is equivalent to,
S0 = {X = {X} : D (S||X) = 0} (122)
= {X = {X} : pS = pX} (123)
Since Cachin’s definition does not model noise, we may
consider it as noiseless and apply Theorem 3.1,
C(W,g) = sup
X∈S0
H(X) = H(S). (124)
This result states that in a system that is perfectly secure (in
Cachin’s definition), the limit on the amount of information
that may be transferred each channel use is equal to the entropy
of the source. This is intuitive because in Cachin’s definition
the output distribution of the encoder is constrained to be equal
to the cover-signal distribution.
B. Empirical Distribution Steganalyzer
The empirical distribution steganalyzer is motivated by the
fact that the empirical distribution from a stationary memory-
less source converges to the actual distribution of that source.
Accordingly, if the empirical distribution of the test signal
converges to the cover-signal distribution it is considered to
be non-steganographic.
Assume that pS is a discrete distribution over the finite
alphabet S. Let a sequence, {sn}∞n=1 with each sn ∈ Sn be
used to specify the steganalyzer for a test signal x as,
gn(x) =
{
0 if P[sn] = P[x],
1 if P[sn] 6= P[x]. (125)
where P[x] is the empirical distribution of x.
The permissible set for gn is equal to the type class of P[sn],
i.e.,
Pgn = T (P[sn]) :=
{
x ∈ Xn : P[x] = P[sn]
}
. (126)
Theorem 5.1 (Empircal Distribution Steganalyzer Capacity):
C(W,g) = H (S) . (127)
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Fig. 10. Moulin Stego-channel
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Decoder
M
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X
X = YS
φn(y)fn(m, s)Source
Detection
Fig. 11. Equivalent Stego-channel
Proof: Since the channel is noiseless we may apply
Theorem 3.1.
C(W,g) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Pgn | (128a)
= lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |T (sn)| (128b)
= H(S) (128c)
Here we have used the fact that the permissible set for
the empirical distribution detection function is the type
class in (128b). Additionally, by Varadarjan’s Theorem[17],
P[sn](x) → pS(x) almost surely (here the convergence is
uniform in x as well). This allows for the use of the type
class-entropy bound from Theorem D.1 that provides the final
result.
C. Moulin Steganographic Capacity
Moulin’s formulation[2], [3] of the stego-channel is shown
in Figure 10. This is somewhat different than the formulation
shown in Figure 1; most notable is the presence of distortion
constraints and an absence of a distortion function prior to
the steganalyzer. Additionally, an explicit steganalyzer is not
defined and a hypothetical X ∼ pS is used. In order to have
the two formulations coincide a number of simplifications are
needed for each model.
For our model,
• The stego-channel is noiseless
• The steganalyzer is the empirical distribution
For Moulin’s model,
• Passive adversary (D2 = 0)
• No distortion constraint on encoder (D1 =∞)
These changes produce the stego-channel shown in Fig-
ure 11.
Theorem 5.2: For the stego-channel shown in Figure 11,
the capacities of this work and Moulin’s agree,
C(W,g) = CSTEG(∞, 0) = H (S) . (129)
Proof: Theorem 5.1 shows C(W,g) = H (S).
We now show Moulin’s capacity is equal to this value. In
the case of a passive adversary (D2 = 0), the following is the
capacity of the stego-channel[2],
CSTEG(D1, 0) = sup
Q′∈Q′
H(X |S) (130)
where a p ∈ Q′ is feasible if,∑
s,x
p(x|s)pS(s)d(s, x) ≤ D1, (131)
and ∑
s
p(x|s)pS(s) = pS(x). (132)
The capacity can be found for unbounded D1 as,
CSTEG(∞, 0) = sup
p(x|s)∈Q′
H(X |S) (133a)
= H(S)− min
p(x|s)∈Q′
I(S;X) (133b)
= H(S) (133c)
where the final line comes from choosing p(x) = pS(x).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A framework for evaluating the capacity of steganographic
channels under an active adversary has been introduced. The
system considers a noise corrupting the signal before the
detection function in order to model real-world distortions
such as compression, quantization, etc.
Constraints on the encoder dealing with distortion and a
cover-signal are not considered. Instead, the focus is to develop
the theory necessary to analyze the interplay between the chan-
nel and detection function that results in the steganographic
capacity.
The method uses an information-spectrum approach that
allows for the analysis of arbitrary detection functions and
channels. This provides machinery necessary to analyze a very
broad range of steganographic channels.
In addition to offering insight into the limits of performance
for steganographic algorithms, this formulation of capacity can
be used to analyze a different and fundamentally important
facet of steganalysis. While false alarms and missed signals
have rightfully dominated the steganalysis literature, very little
is known about the amount of information that can be sent past
these algorithms. This work presents a theory to shed light
onto this important quantity called steganographic capacity.
APPENDIX A
ǫ-STRONG CONVERSE PROOF
A stego-channel (W,g,A) satisfies the ǫ-strong converse
property (for a fixed δ) if and only if,
sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z) = sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z). (A.134)
Proof: First assume supX∈Sδ I(X;Z) =
supX∈Sδ I(X;Z). Let R = C(0, δ|W,g,A) + 3γ with
γ > 0. Consider an (n,Mn, ǫn, δn)-code with,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn ≥ R,
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and
lim sup
n→∞
δn ≤ δ.
Let X represent the uniform input due to this code and Z the
output after the channel Q = AX. From the Feinstein Dual
[6], [7] we know,
ǫn ≥ Pr
{
1
n
i(Xn;Zn) ≤ 1
n
logMn − γ
}
− e−nγ . (A.135)
We also know there exists n0 such that for all n > n0 that,
1
n
logMn ≥ R− γ, (A.136)
so for n > n0,
ǫn ≥ Pr
{
1
n
i(Xn;Zn) ≤ R− 2γ
}
− e−nγ . (A.137)
We now show that the probability term above tends to 1.
Using Theorem 2.2 we have,
R = C(0, δ|W,g,A) + 3γ (A.138)
= supX∈Sδ I(X;Z) + 3γ (A.139)
= supX∈Sδ I(X;Z) + 3γ (A.140)
Rewriting gives,
R− 2γ = sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z) + γ. (A.141)
By the definition of I(X;Z) we finally have,
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
1
n
i(Xn;Zn) ≤ R − 2γ
}
= 1, (A.142)
which together with A.137 shows that that limn→∞ ǫn = 1.
For the other direction assume,
lim
n→∞
ǫn = 1, (A.143)
and,
lim sup
n→∞
δn ≤ δ. (A.144)
Set R = C(0, δ|W,g,A)+ γ for any γ > 0 and set Mn =
enR. Clearly,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
logMn = R > C(0, δ|W,g,A).
For any X ∈ Sδ (and its corresponding Z), using Feinstein’s
Lemma [11] we have an (n,Mn, ǫn)-code satisfying,
ǫn ≤ Pr
{
1
n
i(Xn;Zn) ≤ R+ γ
}
+ e−nγ . (A.145)
From the error assumption we see that,
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
1
n
i(Xn;Zn) ≤ R+ γ
}
= 1. (A.146)
This means that,
R+ γ ≥ I(X;Z), (A.147)
and since X ∈ Sδ is arbitrary we have,
R+ γ ≥ sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z). (A.148)
Substituting we have that,
sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z) ≤ R+ γ (A.149)
= C(0, δ|W,g,A) + 2γ (A.150)
= supX∈Sδ I(X;Z) + 2γ (A.151)
As γ is arbitrarily close to 0 we have,
sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z) ≤ sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z). (A.152)
Also, by definition,
sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z) ≥ sup
X∈Sδ
I(X;Z), (A.153)
showing equality and completing the proof.
APPENDIX B
SPECTRAL INF-ENTROPY BOUND
For a discrete g = {Pn}∞n=1 with corresponding secure
output set T0,
sup
Y∈T0
H(Y) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Pn|
Proof: Let U(A) represent the uniform distribution on a
set A.
Since Y∗ = {U(Pn)}∞i=1 ∈ T0 we have,
sup
Y∈T0
H(Y) ≥ H(Y∗) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Pn| (B.154)
Now assume there exists Y ∈ T0 with Y = {Y¯ n}∞n=1, such
that,
H(Y) = H(Y∗) + 3γ, (B.155)
for any γ > 0.
This means that,
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
1
n
log
1
pY¯ n(Y¯
n)
< H(Y∗) + 2γ
}
= 0 (B.156)
By (B.154) we have H(Y∗) = lim infn→∞ 1n log |Pn| and
from the definition of lim inf we may find a subsequence
indexed by kn such that,
H(Y∗) + 2γ ≥ 1
kn
log |Pkn |+ γ. (B.157)
For any kn (B.157) holds and we have,
Pr
{
1
kn
log
1
pY¯ kn (Y¯
kn)
<
1
kn
log |Pkn |+ γ
}
≤
Pr
{
1
kn
log
1
pY¯ kn (Y¯
kn)
< H(Y∗) + 2γ
}
. (B.158)
Applying this result to (B.156) we have,
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
1
kn
log
1
pY¯ kn (Y¯
kn)
<
1
kn
log |Pkn |+ γ
}
= 0.
(B.159)
For any ǫ > 0 and n greater than some n0,
Pr
{
pY¯ kn (Y¯
kn) >
e−knγ
Pkn
}
< ǫ. (B.160)
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 16
Let,
Akn =
{
y ∈ Yn : pY¯ kn (Y¯ kn) >
e−knγ
|Pkn |
}
, (B.161)
and for all n > n0, we have pY¯ kn (Akn) < ǫ.
For n > n0 we may calculate the probability of the
permissible set (for the subsequence) as,
pY¯ kn (Pkn) =
∑
y∈Pkn
pY¯ kn (y) (B.162a)
=
∑
y∈Pkn∩A
c
kn
pY¯ kn (y) +
∑
y∈Pkn∩Akn
pY¯ kn (y)
(B.162b)
≤
∑
y∈Pkn
e−knγ
|Pkn |
+
∑
y∈Akn
pY¯ kn (y) (B.162c)
< e−knγ + ǫ (B.162d)
This shows pY¯ kn (Pkn)−→6 1 and we have a contradiction
as Y /∈ T0.
APPENDIX C
SPECTRAL SUP-ENTROPY BOUND
For discrete g = {Pn}∞n=1 with corresponding secure output
set T0,
sup
Y∈T0
H(Y) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Pn|
Proof: Since Y∗ = {U(Pn)}∞i=1 ∈ T0 we have,
sup
Y∈T0
H(Y) ≥ H(Y∗) (C.163a)
= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Pn| (C.163b)
Now assume there exists Y ∈ T0, with Y = {Y¯ n}∞n=1 such
that,
H(Y) = H(Y∗) +
γ
4
, (C.164)
for any γ > 0.
This means that,
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
1
n
log
1
pY¯ n(Y¯
n)
> H(Y∗) +
γ
2
}
= 0 (C.165)
By the definition of lim sup for some subsequence kn we
have,
1
kn
log |Pkn |+ γ > H(Y∗) +
γ
2
(C.166)
and
lim
n→∞
Pr
{
1
kn
log
1
pY¯ kn (Y¯
kn)
>
1
kn
log |Pkn |+ γ
}
= 0.
(C.167)
For any ǫ > 0 letting,
Akn =
{
y ∈ Xn : pY¯ kn (Y¯ kn) <
e−knγ
|Pkn |
}
(C.168)
we may find n0 where for n > n0,
pY¯ kn (Akn) < ǫ. (C.169)
For n > n0 the probability of the permissible set (in this
subsequence) is,
pY¯ kn (Pkn) =
∑
x∈Pkn
pY¯ kn (y) (C.170a)
=
∑
y∈Pkn∩A
c
kn
pY¯ kn (y)
+
∑
y∈Pkn∩Akn
pY¯ kn (y) (C.170b)
≤ e
−knγ
|Pkn |
∑
y∈Pkn∩A
c
kn
1
+
∑
y∈Pkn∩Akn
pY¯ kn (y) (C.170c)
< e−knγ + ǫ (C.170d)
showing it is impossible for Y ∈ T0.
APPENDIX D
TYPE SET SIZE ENTROPY
Theorem D.1: Let (p1, p2, . . .) be a sequence of types de-
fined over the finite alphabet X where pn ∈ Pn. Assume this
sequence satisfies the following:
1) pn → p
2) pn ≺≺ p, ∀n
Then,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |T (pn)| = H(p). (D.171)
Proof: We first show,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |T (pn)| ≥ H(p). (D.172)
A sharpening of Stirling’s approximation states that for
1
12n+1 < λn <
1
12 ,
n! =
√
2πnn+
1
2 e−neλn .
Let the empirical distribution, pn be specified by
(n1, . . . , nKn). If we enumerate the outcomes as
(a1, . . . , aKn) we have that,
pn(ai) =
ni
n
.
By definition
∑Kn
i=1 ni = n, and from the above condition
of absolute continuity we have that Kn ≤ s(p) for all n, where
s(p) is the support of the final distribution.
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log |T (pn)| = log
(
n!
n1!, n2!, . . . , nKn !
)
= log
√
2πnn+
1
2 e−neλn∏Kn
i=1
(√
2πn
ni+
1
2
i e
−nieλni
)
= n logn−
Kn∑
i=1
ni logni + log
√
2πneλn
−
Kn∑
i=1
log
(√
2πnie
λni
)
≥ nH (pn)−Kn log
(√
2πne
1
12
)
This implies that,
1
n
log |T (pn)| ≥ H (pn)− s(p)
n
log
(√
2πne
1
12
)
.
Taking the lim inf of each side,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |T (pn)| ≥ lim inf
n→∞
H (pn) = H(p). (D.173)
Now we have from the type class upper-bound[14] that,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |T (pn)| ≤ lim sup
n→∞
H(pn). (D.174)
Combing with (D.173) gives the desired result.
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